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ABSTRACT 
Advoca tes of strong artificial intelligence believe that 
properly programmed computers can go beyond the simulation of 
intelligent acts so as to instantiate and exhibit true 
intelligence, that is, intelligence egui valent to that of man. 
In this thesis, I consider three problems for strong-AI. 
First, John Searle's well-known thought experiment of 
the "Chinese Room" is used to reestablish the syntax-semantics 
distinction and to show how this distinction applies to 
computer programs. I review the Chinese Room, consider a 
variet y of objections to it, and then expand on the key points 
in Searle's work. 
Second, 1 examine the Frame Problem in artificial 
intelligence, a guest ion made popular by Daniel Dennett. 
Ra tional agents have the ability to adjust their conceptual 
schemes and update their noetic web of beliefs so as to 
maintain a representation of the world. This ability is easily 
observed but not well understood. r argue that computers lack 
this ability altogether. The Frame Problem examines this 
deficiency and programming technigues designed to overcome it. 
Third, the Overseer Problem examines the need for 
artificial systems to have a rational agent in place who 
designates a given task and determines when that task is 
successfully completed by the system. I argue that as long as 
this need exists, artificial systems cannot be considered 
intelligent in an uneguivocal sense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are about to conceive of the knower as a computing machine. 
Warren S. McCulloch, M.D. 
"Through the Den of the Metaphysician," 1954 
I am prepared to go so far as to say that within a few years, if there 
remain any philosophers who are not familiar with some of the main 
developments in artificial intelligence, it will be fair to accuse them of 
professional incompetence, and that to teach courses in philosophy of 
mind, epistemology ... without discussing ... aspects of artificial 
intelligence will be as irresponsible as giving a course in physics which 
includes no quantum theory. 
Aaron Sloman 
The Computer Revolution in Philosophy, 1978 
Often in the history of philosophy, philosophers have had 
to field concerns, guestions, and claims from other disciplines. 
This is such a time. Artificial intelligence, once an obscure 
corner of computer science, raises guestions and makes claims 
tha t tradi tionall y belong to the epistemologist and meta-
physician, to the philosopher of language and mind, as well as 
the psychologist and neurophysiologist. In this work, I will 
examine some of the philosophical concerns surrounding these 
claims. 
1. The Problem 
Let's start to outline the field of interest with some 
terms. The first is "strong artificial intelligence." This term 
names the position that, as Michael Arbib says, "AI programs 
really could exhibit understanding or intelligence, rather than 
simply simulate aspects of behaviors we construe as 
intelligent when performed by a human being" (emphasis mine).l. 
"Weak AI" is similar to the former view although weak AI is 
limited to simUlation and makes no claims about true machine 
intelligence. I will use "Alers" to designate supporters of 
D 
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strons-AI. "AI" itself is an elusive term to define, but here 
are a couple of attempts by those in the field: 
Al is that part of computer science concerned with designing 
intelligent computer systems, Le. systems that exhibit the 
characteristics which we associate with intelligence in human 
behaviour--e.g. understanding language, learning, reasoning, 
solving problems etc. z 
[A system is artificially intelligent] if the task [the system] 
is carrying out would require intelligence if performed by 
humans. a 
Why is it that AI has been such a hot topic philo-
sophicall y? One reason is that philosophers perceive a major 
misunderstandins of computer science claims at the popular 
level. This often happens when technical terms--in any field, 
not just computer science--are imported back into popular 
wri tins. Another reason lies in the sometimes outlandish 
claims of Alers that reach far beyond their field. Consider for 
example this scenario envisioned by Carnes ie-Mellon researcher 
Hans Moravec. One day all knowledse and skills will be stored 
in computers and "down-loaded" to people whenever they require 
such expertise. 
This will result in a gradual erosion of individuality, and 
formation of an incredibly potent community. . .. [Which will 
be] constantly improving and extending itself, spreading 
outwards from the solar system, converting non-life into 
mind. . .. This process, possibly occurring now elsewhere, 
might convert the entire universe into an extended thinking 
entity.4 
If a philosopher or theolosian made such claims, he would not 
be taken very seriously. 
Let's examine strons-AI more closely. "Intellisent 
beha vior" is picked out, somewhat intuitively, and identified 
F 
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wi th those acts carried out by humans that artifacts (normally) 
cannot carry out.s Compu ters can be made to act intelligently 
via rule-governed symbol manipulation (i.e., they are 
programmed). The digital computer is a systematic symbol 
shuffler. That is, at one level of computational description, 
l's and O's are moved to the right place at the right time 
according to the hardware restraints and the software 
instruction. At a deeper level, transistors are systema ticall y 
turned on and off. The program determines the rules by which 
these manipulations will occur. According to this "rules-and-
representations" view (RR), humans also must or might (there is 
a spectrum of opinion here) produce intelligent behavior 
through an internal set of rules. Supporters of RR point to 
logic and language as paradigm cases of rule governedness 
tha t would reguire such mental symbols. Both humans and 
compu ters would, therefore, comprise a larger class of 
"information processing systems." Al though the RR view does 
not apply to all branches of computer science, it has domina ted 
the AI community for the past twenty years. Strong AI working 
under the RR model is now called classic or "good-old-
fashioned-AI" (GOFAI, coined by John Haugeland). 
Tradi tionall y optimism runs high in GOFAI. Herbert Simon 
of Carnegie-Mellon Uni versi ty claims that Ii terall y thinking 
machines now exist. In fact, these machines have thoughts in 
the strictest sense of the term.""' Alan Newell, Simon's long-
time associate, claims that intelligence just is physical symbol 
F 
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manipula tion. If machines manipulate the symbols in the "right 
way," the machines should embody intelligence in precisely the 
same sense as humans."7 In a paper by both Simon and Newell 
they write, 
There are now in the world machines that think, that learn and 
that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is 
going to increase rapidly until--in the visible future--the 
range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the 
range to which the human mind has been applied. El 
Marvin Minsky of MIT, perhaps the most important thinker in AI, 
thinks that humans might be reduced to household pets by the 
next generation of computers.'" Finally, John McCarthy, 
inventor of the term "artificial intelligence," says the 
"ascription of mental guali ties is most straightforward for 
machines of known structure such as thermostats and computer 
opera ting systems •••• "10 For example, your furnace 
thermosta t has at least three beliefs: it's too hot, it's too 
cold, it's just right. These are a few of the more celebrated 
opinions found in GOFAI circles. 
II. General Outline 
The subject matter discussed so far is both broad and 
deep enough to take in many directions. I will focus on three, 
one per chapter. 
Chapter 1 will deal with the syntax-semantics 
distinction--actually the failure to maintain this distinction. 
AI critics argue that at the core of any digital computer 
system is a network of switches. The on-off manipulations 
(even the l's and O's in the machine code) are purely syntactic: 
f 
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tokens are shuffled around in a rule-governed way. AIers 
counter that at the system level (i.e, the system-as-a-whole), 
complex rule-governed behavior allows for the emergence of 
semantic content: the tokens will have meaning. John Searle's 
"Chinese Room" thought-experiment will serve as the pivotal 
example through which to address this problem. I will argue, in 
agreement with Searle, that syntax is never sufficient for 
semantics, although the Chinese Room example is not without 
its shortcomings. 
Chapter 2 will focus on what some believe to be an 
insurmountable epistemic problem for the RR view, viz., the 
Frame Problem. In short, the frame problem is the computer's 
inabili ty to abstract (what we consider to be) important details 
from common experience and to then use this information to 
guide its future behavior. I will argue that the frame problem 
is not another technical difficulty to be overcome in time, but 
ra ther that the classic RR model is inadegua te to handle this 
difficulty. AI is guite possibly in the midst of a paradigm 
shift because of the chronic failure to overcome this problem 
and because of the early successes of a rival model. 
As Thomas Kuhn has shown, to have a paradigm shift, 
there must be a rival paradigm. In Chapter 3 I will briefly 
present some key aspects of the rival "connectionist" approach. 
The main topic of the chapter is to present yet another diffi-
cuI t y, what I will call the Overseer Problem, that affects not 
onl y GOFAI computers, but the new connectionist systems as 
z 
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well. 
III. An Important Qualifica bon 
Eguivocating over technical-operational and popular 
terms has a long and glorious history in AI. Some in the 
artificial intelligentsia purposefully deny that there is any 
eguivocation. McCarthy provides a key example: 
To ascribe certain "beliefs", "knowledge", "free will", 
"intentions", "consciousness", "abilities" or "wants" to 
a machine or computer program is legitimate when such an 
ascription expresses the same information about the machine 
that it expresses about a person," 
Here is a clear case where the metaphorical use of 
anthropomorphic terms has ceased to be metaphorical. I see 
nothing wrong with using mental terms to describe the behavior 
and function of various computer operations; however, we must 
realize that such ascriptions are (usually) intended as 
analogies only. For example, one might describe a chess-
playing computer as believing that its king is in trouble. In 
fact, the computer "believes" nothing nor does it have any 
conception of "king" or "chess" for that matter. The computer 
is simply executing the commands it has been programmed to 
carry out. Mental terms used in this analogous way are (or at 
least were) useful shorthands in denoting a given behavior. 
In Section I of his paper "Artificial Intelligence Meets 
Na tural Stupidity," Drew McDermott explains that programmers 
sometimes become entranced by the~r own "wishful mnemonics.":l.2 
McDermott shows how a suggestive subroutine like UNDERSTAND, 
GOAL, or ASSERT might get its name before the programmer 
• 
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knows if his algorithm has any chance of simulating what's 
being named •. 
If [the programmer] calls the main loop of his program 
'UNDERST AND', he is (until proven innocent) merely begging the 
question. He may mislead a lot of people, most prominently 
himself, and enrage a lot of others. What he should do instead 
is refer to this main loop as 'G0034' and see if he can 
convince himself or anyone else that G0034 implements some 
part of understanding. 1 ::3 
Such oversights ultima tel y hurt the AI field. Slogans 
and buzz words, especially when used outside of a technical 
context, have come to confuse more than clarify. 
Wi th this danger plainly in view, such metaphorical terms 
still have heuristic value. As long as the metaphor is clearly 
noted, using 'learns,' 'sees,' etc., to describe computer 
behavior is a useful shorthand. Thus the reader is warned up 
front that my use of anthropomorphic terms in this manner in 
no way endorses a reduction of any kind. With this 
qualification firmly established, let's enter the Chinese Room • 
r 
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CHAPTER 1 
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND SEARLE 
For Searle, intentionality is rather like a wonderful substance secreted by 
the brain the way the pancreas secretes insulin. Brains produce 
intentionality. he says, whereas other objects, such as computer programs, 
do not. . .. Luckily for us ... our brains make intentionality; if they 
didn't we'd behave just as we now do, but of course we wouldn't mean it! 
Daniel Dennett 
"The Milk of Human Intentionality," 1980 
There is a tendency in AI today towards flashy, splashy domains .... 
Yet there is no program that has common sense; no program that learns 
things that it has not been explicitly been taught how to learn .... 
Douglas Hofstadter 
"Artificial Intelligence: Subcognition as Computation," 1983 
In the twentieth century, the philosophy of language has 
become a hotly contested sub-discipline. Regardless of one's 
position, all agree that many helpful distinctions have been 
made. The distinction I will focus on in this chapter causes 
Ii t tle controversy until computer intelligence comes into play. 
This is the distinction between syntax and semantics. 
Syntax is the realm of symbols (tokens) and their proper 
manipula tion. 1 Syntactic rules tell us "what counts": which 
tokens are allowed and in what order they are to be recognized. 
For example, among the specified tokens in arithmetic we have 
'1', '2', '3', '+', and '='. In first grade we learn that '2 + 1 = 3' 
is an allowable string of arithmetic tokens whereas '2 1 + = 3' 
is not. The symbols are arbitrary, of course, e.g., we know that 
'1 + 8 = 9' is the same as 'I + VIII = IX' in Roman numerals. But 
what do we mean by "is the same as?" 
To answer this Cjuestion, we enter the realm of 
semantics. The Arabic and Roman numerals are the same in the 
b 
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sense that we assign the same semantic content to '8', 'VIII', 
and 'eight'. Tokens themselves lack semantic content; they are 
meaningless. Tokens only have meaning when they are 
interpreted. 
Computers are syntactic engines. In the introduction, we 
saw that they manipulate symbols according to the rules of a 
given program. AIers (recall this designates strong-AI, RR 
enthusiasts) c:laim that syntactic rules can be of sufficient 
complexity when embodied in a computer program so that a 
computer can go beyond simple syntax and actually understand 
the commands being executed. That is, given a sufficiently rich 
syntactic program code, the computer will provide semantic 
content to its symbols. Under the RR model of cognition, we do 
much the same thing--people have an internal syntax that 
produces our semantics. 
John Searle's main criticism of this view is simple: 
There is a distinction between manipulating the syntactical 
elements of language and actually understanding the language 
at a semantic level. What is lost in the AI simulation of 
cognitive behaviour is the distinction between syntax and 
semantics,2 
Searle's thought-experiment illustrates that manipulating 
symbols according to a list of rules will never produce under-
standing in the mechanism--biological or mechanical--executing 
the rules. In short, syntax is never sufficient for semantics. 
I. Searle's Chinese Room: The Argument 
The experiment runs as follows (! will put myself in 
Searle's role).::!! Imagine I am in a small room with baskets full 
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of Chinese language characters. It is important to note that I 
do not understand Chinese in the least--the characters are 
just different tokens to me. I have been provided with a rule 
book, written in English <which I obviously understand), with 
instructions for matching these symbols with other symbols. I 
use the term 'symbol' here under the assumption that these 
tokens symbolize something to someone. The rules in the book 
govern the manipulation of the symbols by their shape alone; no 
translations or meanings are provided. Outside the room, 
native Chinese people have access to two slots, In and Out, and 
have no idea what's going on inside. They slip pieces of paper 
with Chinese characters through the In slot and I match these 
symbols with those specified by the rule book. The book 
instructs which symbols to then pick out of the baskets and 
send through the Out slot. 
Unbeknownst to me, the people outside are putting 
questions, not just random symbols, in the In slot and, from 
their point of view, answers to these questions are coming 
through the Out slot. This exchange is exactly what the 
wri ters of the rule book intended. These "answers" to 
"CJuestions" are in perfect Chinese syntax and obey standard 
Chinese semantic rules. As far as the Chinese are concerned, 
whoever is in the room seems to understand their language. 
But I do not understand Chinese. 
The analogy to a digital computer lines up this way. The 
rule book corresponds to a computer program written in 
Koperski 12 
whatever artificial language you like (e.g., LISP, the 
traditional language for AD. The rule book writers are the 
programmers, the only one's who know what's going on inside and 
ou tside the room. The baskets of symbols are a data base. I 
am the computer, or perhaps specifically the CPU. The In slot 
serves as an input terminal and the Out slot is a printer. 
The thrust of the argument is really gui te simple: 
If I do not understand Chinese solely on the basis of running a 
computer program for understanding Chinese, then neither does 
any other digital computer solely on that basis. Digital 
computers merely manipulate formal symbols according to rules 
in the program. o4 
We may break the argument down this way: 
I)( is able to execute a list of rules that simulates the 
understanding of language L to some observer ~. 
I)( does not understand L. 
Therefore the execution of a list of rules is not 
sufficient for I)( to understand L. 
II. The Chinese Room: Application 
The thought-experiment is intriguing and for the most 
part uncontroversial as it stands. Of course, Searle uses the 
Chinese Room as a launching pad for a more elaborate argument 
consisting specifically of four premises <P) and four 
conclusions (C).E.i 
(Pi> Brains cause minds. This premise is unnecessary and 
serves primarily to affirm Searle's physicalism. The mind is 
viewed here as a higher order property of the brain (higher, 
tha t is, than say its greyness or solidity). Searle might agree 
with Minsky's belief that "minds are what brains do"; however, 
Searle strives to preserve the concept of mind from hasty 
Koperski 13 
reductions, especially those of the elimina ti ve ma terialist. 6 
Except for this premise, as Sir John Eccles points out, 
Searle's argument could easily come from a dualist in the 
philosophy of mind."7 
(P2) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics. Of course, 
strong-AI calls this begging the question. The RR model claims 
precisely that semantics will be found to be a property of a 
sufficiently rich syntax. The Chinese Room is meant to 
emphasize (and perhaps reestablish> P2. 
(P3) Computer programs are purely formal (syntactic). 
There is no fundamental reason for programs to be run only on 
digital computers since the program itself only specifies 
syntactic manipulations. The symbols at the machine code level 
(1's and O's, on and off) are wholly abstract and can be 
assigned to any rule-governed system: water pipes, control 
relays, or, according to Searle, "old beer cans strung together 
with wires and powered by windmills." Keep P3 in mind; it will 
become important later on. 
(P4) Minds have mental contents; specifically, they have 
semantic contents. This premise Searle takes as self-evident 
and all of cognitive science assumes it. The cause, not the 
fact, of semantic content is controversial. Searle now moves 
to his conclusions. 
(CD No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a 
system a mind. Programs, in short, are not minds and they are 
not by themselves sufficient for causing minds. The only 
L 
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things we know that cause minds, at this point, are brains. 
Some mental acti vi ties (e.g., logic:) can obviously be simulated 
by computers, so in a (trivial?) sense minds can be described 
computationally. However, simulated "thinking" via 
computational symbol manipulation does not imply that thinking 
is identical to symbol manipulation. 
(C2) The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be 
solely in virtue of running a computer program (P1 + CD. This 
strikes at heart of the RR model. No matter what kind of 
internal syntax the RR might claim we have, it will never be 
rich enough to explain our semantic behavior. 
(C3) Anything else that caused minds would have to have 
causal powers at least eguivalent to those of the brain. The 
opacity of the term 'causal powers' will attract critics en 
masse. This problem will be examined in the next section. 
(C4) For any artifact that we might build that had mental 
states eguivalent to human mental states, the implementation 
of a computer program would not by itself be sufficient for 
those mental states. Searle does not deny the possibility of 
synthetic intelligence, just that such intelligence will not 
simply implement a formal program. Why not? Because any 
formal rules put into the system could, in principle, be 
followed by a human without understanding what the program is 
about. C4 is perhaps simply a corollary of C1. 
III. Facing the Critics 
In the last ten years, Searle has become one of the most 
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prominent philosopher-critics of GOFAI. Not surprisingly, the 
Chinese Room has drawn fire from all corners of cogni ti ve 
science. In this section, I will examine some of these 
cd tic isms and offer possible replies. I assume that Searle 
would agree with these replies to his cd tics, since some of 
these he offers himself, but I cannot guarantee this across 
the board. 
A. "Causal Powers" [C3J: What does this mean? Many 
critics wonder aloud what these causal powers might be. 
Searle leaves his explanation at a rather intui ti ve level 
saying only that physical systems do not exhibit intentionality-
-a t least not yet. However, as a physicalist, Searle cannot 
call on a mind or soul to serve as the metaphysical seat of 
ei ther agent causality or intentions. Other physicalists want 
a material analysis of these causal powers, and right 1 y so. 
Reply. Whatever they are, the brain's causal powers are 
more than just the ability to execute the next rule in a 
syntactic code, which is all the symbols in a program can do. 
Without question, we do need science to help uncover the 
nature of these causal powers of the brain, but the causal 
powers of l's and Q's are already well understood: they are 
abstract symbol carriers only. Furthermore, whether a machine 
has these causal powers is an empirical question. How so? 
Recall Searle has no theoretical objections to the possibility 
of synthetic intelligence (see C4), thus machines with causal 
powers might be invented someday.s The point is, instantiating 
b 
Koperski 16 
a program is not sufficient to provide such machines with 
causal powers. It is this syntactic insufficiency that the 
Chinese Room is directed against, not the possibility of man-
made intelligence. 
I agree with Searle's critics that "causal power" is a 
very opaque term that invites abuse. If such powers are 
empiricall y testable, as Searle claims, it would help if he 
provided at least an outline for the criteria we might employ 
to find them. Without any empirical guidelines, such causal 
powers remain quite mysterious and out of place for a 
physicalist. In fact, intention ali t y and agent causation are 
tradi tionally called on by dualists to criticize reductive 
theories in the philosophy of mind. Critics rightly sense that 
these elements are difficult to make coherent in a physicalist 
system. 
B. Counterexample: Haugeland's Demon (H-demon). '" In 
trying to nail down Searle's application of causal powers, John 
Haugeland has proposed this counterexample. Consider person 0< 
who has been struck with a rare disease such that his brain's 
neurotransmitters no longer send signals from neuron to 
neuron. We install in o<'s brain an H-demon that "tickles the 
appropriate synapse of the next neuron in a way that is 
functionally indistinguishable, to that neuron, from the arrival 
of genuine neurotransmitters."1.0 The demon is so quick that it 
never falls behind and o<'s brain continues to function. The 
question for Searle is, does this brain still have 
b 
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intentionality (and therefore causal powers)? 
Reply. Searle does not back down: "[o<'sJ neurons still 
ha ve the right causal powers; they just need help from the 
demon."1:I. That is, if the H-demon can reproduce the activity 
wi thin the brain as if it were working properly, then yes, the 
causal powers are maintained and so is intentionality. 
Searle's critics do not like this reply since i t only 
slightly firms up the notion of causal powers. The empirical 
cri terion asked for seems to be simply "x has causal powers iff 
x is a working brain." I believe, however, that Searle's reply 
is consistent with his main point against GOFAI. Note that the 
H-demon does not follow a set of rules (e.g., a computer 
program) to keep o<'s brain going. This new demon-brain system 
might be semi-artificial or synthetic (thus possibly 
intentional, see last reply)' but as long as the demon-brain 
operates by a means other than rule execution, the H-demon is 
not an example of strong-AI. Therefore this is not a 
counterexample to the Chinese Room. 
C. The Systems Reply. This criticism comes from both 
computer and neuro-science. In short it says, "You do not 
understand Chinese, but the room as a whole does." The 
Chinese Room is not complete if we just focus on me, the guy 
inside. The room is also data banks of symbols plus the rule 
book plus scratch pads •• Understanding is ascribed to the 
system, not just me. As Haugeland puts it, "the system as a 
whole manipulates the tokens in ways appropriate to what they 
, 
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mean, with no intervention from outside users; and that's 
semantic activity."12 Searle confuses different levels of 
description and attribution. According to Daniel Dennett, for 
example, "1 understand English; [my] brain doesn't ••. ,"13 No 
one wants to ascribe understanding to the computer's CPU. 
Searle is simply looking too deep. If the system exhibits 
semantic activity, then at the system level we can ascribe 
understanding to it. 
Reply. System level ascription does not escape the 
syntactic-semantic distinction: "[If] I, as the central 
processing unit, have no way of figuring out what any of these 
symbols mean; , •• [then] neither does the whole system."14 
That is, if I don't understand the Chinese symbols, then no 
ma t ter how many useful things you throw in with me, the room 
doesn't understand either. 
Consider a counterexample, suggested by Searle. I 
memorize the rule book and the symbols in the baskets. The 
system is no more; there's just me. I can now apparently read 
and write Chinese, but the guestion is whether I understand 
Chinese the same way I understand English. Clearly I do not. I 
am following the rules I have memorized for dealing with 
Chinese characters, but I still don't know what they mean, 
"Whereas the English subsystem knows that 'hamburger' refers 
to hamburgers, the Chinese subsystem knows only that 'sguiggle 
sguiggle' is followed by 'sguoggle sguoggle'."H5 The key 
difference again rests on what I, as a knowing subject, self-
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reflectively understand or do not understand. No outside 
observer can unerringly make this judgment. 
D. Faulty Model of the Mind-Brain. Although this 
criticism has many versions, I will focus on Marvin Minsky's: 
! don't mean to say that brains or minds are simple; brains are 
immensely complex machines--and so are what they do .. 
Whenever we speak about a mind, we're referring to the 
processes that move our brains from state to state. 1S 
Minsky's point is closely related to the usual criticisms about 
folk psychology. That is, most or all of the events named by 
prescientific mental terms, including Searle's "intentionality" 
and "causal powers," are simply the result of a highly complex, 
physical process. Eventually these pre scientific terms will be 
reduced or replaced by a mature mind science. Searle's 
analysis forces us to give credence to opaque terms derived 
from our own limited introspection. Before we say what 
computers can or cannot understand, let's first allow 
neuroscience and AI to run their course so we really know 
what's going on. 
Reply. Searle's reply continues on the same theme. A 
full y mature neurophysiology with precise scientific jargon will 
not erase the difference between a belief ascribed to an 
artifact and a belief had by a person.:!."? For the sake of 
scientific research, one can certainly put humans, computers, 
and thermostats on a relative "belief continuum." But the 
point Searle comes back to again and again is that our 
ascriptions cannot change the real, first-person, qualitative 
difference between a machine's behavior and our experience. 
I 
1£ Q 
£ 
z: 
t 
R 
Koperski 20 
The gulf between my knowing Chinese and behaving as if I know 
Chinese cannot be bridged by a new scientific description of 
the process. 
E. Misleading Analogy. The Chinese Room gives the 
impression that the subject is doing the equivalent of 
manipulating an AI program by hand. us The reader is led to 
identify with Searle's "feeling the lack of understanding 
Chinese." But human execution of a complex language program 
made for a digital computer would take years! Searle doesn't 
mention this and for good reason. If the question-and-answer 
transaction with the Chinese people outside the room took 
years, the questioners would no longer believe anyone in the 
room understood Chinese. Once this time factor is revealed, 
Searle's intui ti ve link with the reader fails and so does the 
thought-experiment. 
Reply_ The responses to this problem are concise and 
compelling. First, we could replace the man in the room with 
Haugeland's H-demon, which is very fast. Hand manipulating the 
program now is on par with a computer. But when we ask the 
(English speaking) H-demon if he understands Chinese, we get 
the same result as before. Second, when did speed become a 
criterion for intelligence? How fast someone solves a problem 
or thinks about a question might be a measure of his 
intelligence, but time is not a factor in determining whether a 
subject is intelligent. Bringing in a speed element is ad hoc. 
F. Intuition pump.:!.'" For those already sympathetic to 
~----------------------
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the strong-AI side, this is possibly the most damaging 
criticism. Unfortunately for Searle, his entire "argument" is 
nothing but an intuition pump. He doesn't really assert 
anything, but Searle gets the reader to nod his head in 
agreement and say to himself, "Yea, he's right. I would surely 
know whether I understood Chinese are not." According to Ned 
Block, Searle has a hidden premise: "Evidence isn't sufficient 
to overrule the intui tions."2o After all, our intuitions once 
told us Earth is stationary, large objects fall faster than 
small, etc. When evidence is introduced, our intuitions must 
conform. Searle is unfair in two ways. First, he acts like 
evidence is at the mercy of intuition. Second, he does not deal 
wi th any of the evidence for the AI side. Such hand-waving 
over the successes of the field should not be tolerated. 
Reply. 'Intuition' is used here in an egui vocal way. On 
one hand, one's intuitions (Le., thoughts or opinions) about the 
goings on in the Chinese Room are irrelevant. The point of the 
illustration is to emphasize a conceptual truth that is usually 
well understood: syntax is not semantics. The Chinese Room 
attempts to recapture the idea that shuffling uninterpreted 
formal symbols is not the same as understanding their meaning_ 
On the other hand, 'intuition' has an epistemic sense regarding 
one's first-person experience of a si tua tion. I know 
intuitively (i.e., directly and with certainty) that I don't 
understand Chinese. This use is different from the popular 
use of 'intuitive insight' as in "women's intuition." The second 
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~ ~ ! use of 'intuition' is what Searle appeals to in most of his 
I I replies. No third-person observer can have a subject's direct, 
first-person intuition that the subject does or does not 
understand a given symbol. 
In conclusion, Searle's critics often try to take the 
Chinese Room beyond the very limited scope intended. In almost 
every case, the rep I y refocuses the discussion on the key 
issues of syntax-semantics and first-person understanding (or 
lack of understanding). These are the conceptual pillars 
Searle is trying to save from a behavioral reduction. 
IV. Beyond the Chinese Room 
Why is it that the Chinese Room invokes so much 
cri ticism? Most Alers point to the intuition pump. The 
i 
computer science successes brought about by the RR model are 
thought to be a decisive blow against anyone (especially 
bothersome philosophers) who relies solely on non-empirical 
arguments. Although complete brain simulation might be a 
technological impossibility, under the RR theory there is no 
physical impossibility preventing the brain's rule-governed 
acti vi t y from being captured by a program. If we could only 
discover the correct rules and if we had a medium of sufficient 
complexi ty, Alers claim, we would have uneguivocal, non-
metaphorical, artificial intelligence. 
In this section, I will present an adaptation of the 
Chinese Room to try to determine where the line is drawn on 
the application of the RR model (Le., what is it that we may 
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call intelligent?). RR enthusiasts will likely object that my 
application is not what they intended their criteria to be used 
for; however, the thought-experiment is a well established 
device to determine where a theory might lead. 
A. Another Thought Experiment. As I was studying one 
morning, a small robot crawled into my room, handed me a book, 
and promptly disappeared. The book (copyright 2025) contained 
the history of AI research. In the year 2020, engineers at 
IBM-Xerox, Inc. invented (i.e., will invent) the UBS (Ultimate 
Brain Simulation) program. UBS was run on a highly advanced 
optic-digi tal computer, the CRAY-7. With speed and memory 
many orders of magnitude higher than in previous decades, UBS 
on the CRAY-7 can produce any semantic behavior desired. 
According to the now mature RR model of cognition, the CRAY-7 
instantiates true intelligence. 
In 2021, Ed, an electrical engineer who dabbled in 
necromancy, got a copy of UBS but decided not to run it on the 
CRAY-7. A formal program, after all, has no intrinsic 
preference for what physical apparatus carries it out. 
In Ed's wizardly experiments, he learned to conjure up a 
small demon (much like the H-demon described earlier). This H-
demon is not only quick but transdimensional, "blinking" in and 
out of any location instantaneously. Ed teaches the H-demon 
to leave flashlights at every planet and moon in the galaxy. 
Ed decides to run UBS on a galactic scale. 
Impossible? As I mentioned in the introduction, at a 
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deep level of description a digital computer is a system of 
electronic switches that are either on or off, depending on the 
program instruction. Theoretically, any medium that can keep 
track of two physical states (on and off) can carry out a 
program. 
Ed teaches the demon to read the UBS code and switch 
the flashlights on-off as the code instructs. 21 The demon 
periodically checks with Ed for any new commands (lOinterrupts" 
in computer jargon). 
Now if running UBS instantiates true human-level 
intelligence, should we expect the CRAY-7, and now the galaxy 
itself, to have beliefs, perhaps an idea of "self," and even 
free will 7 What criteria would we appl y7 The philosophically 
interesting guestion the galactic brain experiment points to 
is, If intelligence is a property, I, what are we to count as 
candidates for intelligence, x7 Since persons (a) are 
intelligent--the paradigm case if you will--certainly the 
variable x can be replaced with the name of any person, Ia 
(read lOa is intelligent"). Alers also want to substitute certain 
computers (d that meet the RR criteria for intelligence, Ic. 
Now we have another medium that meets 'the RR criteria; but 
does anyone want to count the galaxy (g) as a candidate for 
intelligence, Ig7 What criterion in the RR model allows Ia and 
Ic but disallows Ig7 There are none. 
B. Trying to Fix RR. There are two possible criteria to 
limi t the domain of x. First, Alers could argue the galactic 
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brain is too slow: Ix only if x is fast. This rule is derived 
from the fact that semantic behavior is not observable from a 
system that takes months or years to reply to an inquiry. The 
problem with this criterion is that the RR model does not 
consider speed. Adding a time qualifier is clearly an ad hoc 
fix, but let's allow it for now. 
The galactic brain could still meet the new criteria. 
Instead of one H-demon blinking around space, Ed conjures up 
trillions of H-demons. Better still, Ed discovers that demons 
have trans-dimensional sight. He puts one H-demon per 
flashlight so each demon can read the program code on Earth 
and also see the other lights going on/off. Speed would then 
approach the new requirements. 
The second new criterion possible is spatial localization: 
Ix only if x is spatially localized. g is undeniably non-local, 
but this fix fails as well. What is the standard for 
localiza tion? On a human scale, g is not localized; on a 
uni versal scale, g is very localized (i.e., g is not undeniably 
non-loca!). Like the speed objection, this one is another ad 
hoc fix. I cannot alter the galactic brain to fit this time, but 
such subjective standards tend to weaken the strong-AI case. 
I believe the "what counts" problem for the object of 
predicate I runs throughout the Chinese Room debate. Consider 
three levels of use for mental terms, including intelligence. 
Level one (LU is the neural level. Many believe Ll is where we 
find the sufficient conditions for semantic behavior. Neuro-
Koperski 26 
science focuses here. L2 is the personal level: the common 
use of mental terms has to do with people, not neural 
interactions. Psychology focuses on L2 while AI picks and 
chooses between L1 and L2. There is also an L3 at the level of 
corporate objects like nations and companies. We say things 
like "General Motors loves its customers" and "the United 
States wants all foreign governments •..• " 
Pure reductionists want to dispel with L2 and L3. 
Prereflecti vel y, everyone agrees tha t attributing mental 
properties or actions to corporate objects is highly 
metaphorical. Reductionists go further to say mentalistic 
terms used in folk psychology are likewise non-technical and 
confusing and will eventually be replaced by scientific terms 
(see Minsky above). We should disregard the upper levels of 
mental description in favor of what's "really" going on: neural 
interaction. 
The more common view is to agree with the reductionist 
about corporate objects, but reject the wholesale reduction of 
L2 to L1. Mental terms like 'belief' and 'intention' are not 
sufficiently captured or explained by neural phenomena. This 
is the position of Searle and substance dualists. 22 
c. Operationalism. There is a shadowy middle ground 
between reductionism and folk psychology that sometimes goes 
unrecognized in the AI debate. This terri tory is held by 
opera tionalism, an approach to the philosophies of mind and 
science that will become very important in chapter 3. The 
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operationalists hold that L2 terms (beliefs, desires, etc.) are 
useful and should not be reduced to Ll terms. This differs 
with Searle and the dualists in that, although useful, L2 terms 
for the operationalist have no more ontological weight than L3, 
the corporate-mental terms. 
Here is an example by Dennett. Consider terms used by 
loggers in Maine: 
You can 'trick' an apple tree into 'thinl~ing it's spring' by 
building a small fire under its branches in the late fall; it will 
blossom. This way of talking is not just picturesque and is 
not really superstitious at all; it is simply an efficient way 
of making sense of I controlling, predicting, and explaining the 
behavior of these plants in a way that nicely circumvents one's 
ignorance of the controlling mechanisms. 2 ,", 
L2 is especially needed when a system becomes too 
complex to predict its behavior in Ll terms. That is, it's fine 
to talk about a robot "wanting to go outside" (L2) when an 
explanation in terms of program code and electronics is too 
lang or complex. 'Wanting' conveys the idea adeguately. 
An al terna ti ve use of mental terms is seen in the 
programmer who starts with L2 and works his way to L1. In a 
chess program, for example, the programmer wants to make the 
computer protect-the-king. The nation of protect-the-king 
must then be translated dawn to the Ll program code level to 
make the system perform the L2 behavior. 
L2 is not a property of the system, rather L2 reflects 
our stance or attitude toward the system.24 Note that 
operationalists in AI are usually operational only with respect 
to L2 and L3 and scientific realists regarding L1. L2 has 
I J. __________________ __ 
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heuristic, predictive value only and has nothing to do with the 
nature of the system under investigation--man or machine. Ll 
is where real explanations are found. 
Why is operationalism important here? I mention this 
approach because operationalists use mental terms much like 
Searle or a dualist would use them. For the latter two, 
however, L2 has more than just heuristic value. L2 for Searle 
sa ys something about the system itself, not just how we might 
view it. The AI debate is about whether a system really is 
intelligent or has desires. Operationalism does little to help 
answer this guestion, but might sound to the unwary reader as 
if it does. 
V. Epistemology and At tribu tion 
Some of the confusion over the Chinese Room could be 
eliminated if all the participants would maintain a consistent 
epistemic relationship to the system being discussed. That is, 
critics often alter their epistemic position without warning 
the reader. By 'epistemic position' (EP) I mean the relationship 
between an agent and a state of affairs whereby the agent is 
justified in holding certain beliefs about that state of 
affairs. 
I'm sure an example would be useful. Say I am in my study 
and I come to the belief p that my wife is doing cartwheels in 
the living room. Now I have no evidence for this, thus p is 
unjustified given my epistemic position (which coincidentally 
corresponds to my physical location). If however, I go into the 
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hall and see my wife's shadow flipping all about and hear the 
crash of a lamp on the floor, my epistemic position has changed. 
I now have some justification for p. It is important to note 
that epistemic position does not affect the truth of any 
belief. I can be justified in a belief and still be wrong. This 
last point is simply the well-known distinction between truth 
and justification. 
Let's apply EP to the Chinese Room. The Chinese people 
only have access to the IN/OUT slots of the room. Call their 
epistemic position EP1. Given the apparent replies they 
receive to their guestions, those at EP1 are justified in 
believing p1 = 'someone inside the room understands Chinese'. 
Those in the strong-AI camp argue that we are in an 
analogous EP to those at EPl when we approach a highly 
sophisticated computer system. That is, given the system's 
semantic behavior, we are justified in believing p2 = 'the 
computer understands z' where z is the subject matter of the 
program (e.g., chess). Just like the Chinese people, we have 
behavioral evidence that the computer understands what it is 
doing. p2 might be false, but given our EP, we may rightly 
a t tribute intelligence to certain intricate systems. Or so the 
argument goes. 
Let's go back to the Chinese Room. Say one of the 
Chinese doesn't like the answer he received and takes a sledge 
hammer to the OUT slot. The window breaks revealing Searle 
wi th his rule book and baskets of symbols. As the Chinese 
.1 ___________________ .... 
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begin to investigate, they come to realize that Searle doesn't 
understand a bit of Chinese; he's just doing what his rule book 
tells him. Now their EP has changed from EPl to EP2 given the 
new evidence. At EP2, they are no longer justified in believing 
pl. 
The key to Searle's experiment is that we are not in an 
analogous epistemic position to EPl with respect to complex 
computers. Rather, we are closer to EP2. We know exactly 
what's going on inside: rule-governed symbol manipulation 
following the instructions of a well-defined computer code. We 
can get beyond the behavior of the system down to how the 
(apparent) semantic acti vi t y has been genera ted. 25 
An anticipated reply to this analysis of EP comes from 
the classic "other minds" problem in philosophy. Searle briefly 
considers this himself.2c I can't know with certainty that 
anyone else has a mind (or consciousness or intelligence, etc.) 
like I know that I have a mind. Everyone else could be an 
android controlled by Descartes' evil genius. From my EP, all 
the evidence available to me for believing you have a mind is 
your behavior. Why not use the same behavioral criteria for a 
computer? 
In reply, note that the AI criticism short-changes us on 
the available evidence. The criteria I use to infer that 
others have minds is based on our similar behavior in similar 
situations, but behavior is not the only thing we have in 
common. There are both behavioral and physical similarities to 
... -----------------------
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consider, specifically, I and other humans share a close 
neurophysiological similarity that I do not share with 
computers. This commonality is the backbone of Richard 
Swinburne's principles of charity and credulity used to deal 
with the other-minds objection (see his Evolution of the Soul 
pp. 13-17 for a detailed analysis). The problem with at tribu ting 
a mind or intelligence to a computer is our obvious lack of 
similari t y in physiology. At present, neuroscience is not 
mature enough to say how far the notion of intelligence can be 
removed from the only paradigm case available: human brains. 
Swinburne points out that, 
It would be different if we had a well-justified general theory 
of consciousness , , , that explained which physical processes 
of kinds currently unknown give rise to which mental 
events, , " Then we could examine the Martians and robots to 
see whether their physical processes were of a charac ter to 
give rise to mental events, i.e, were similar to our own in 
whatever respects the theory had identified as crucial for 
this,27 
In lieu of such a comprehensive mind-theory, our EP 
allows us to conclude only that beings with both behavior and 
physiology like ourselves are intelligent. In terms of the 
earlier discussion, Ix is limited to x's that are human, at least 
for the time being. 28 If behavior were all we had to go on to 
judge whether a given computer is intelligent, then our EP 
would allow for the attribution of intelligence. But we are not 
so limited. 
VI. Conclusion 
Neither Swinburne (a dualist) nor Searle (a physicalist) 
objects to theoretical synthetic intelligence. The point of the 
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Chinese Room is that whatever form this synthetic intelligence 
takes, it will not simply instantiate formal rules. It must 
a ffix semantic content as well. The driving cogni ti ve model of 
AI, the RR model, is inadegua te for true intelligence, since it 
maintains that syntactic rules are sufficient for semantic 
behavior. But as we have repeatedly seen, there is a distinct, 
first -person, guali ta ti ve difference between my understanding 
of, say, English, and the ability to act as if I understood 
English by following a rich syntactic rule book. 
The galactic brain thought-experiment and the discussion 
on epistemic position have demonstrated the difference 
between our attribution of intelligence to systems for 
heuristic purposes, and the guestion of whether a system is 
intelligent or not. This distinction must be kept in mind when 
reading the vast array of literature on the Chinese Room and 
AI itself. 
Koperski 33 
NOTES 
l.The term 'symbol' is somewhat ambiguous. One usage is 
such that something can only be a symbol if it is viewed a.s 
symbolic of something else. The notion of symbolism, something 
standing for something else, is semantic. The usage here is 
syntactic, referring to the figure itself: '<"', '@', '¥', 'z', '$' • 
2John Searle, "Minds and Brains without Programs," in 
Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and 
Consciousness, ed. Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield (New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 215. 
3The Chinese Room is discussed in several publications 
by Searle. The best known is "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The 
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980>: 417-457. This includes 
numerous commentaries representing all parts of cogni ti ve 
science. 
4John Searle, "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" 
Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 26. 
5John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge: 
Harvard Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 39-41. 
6For a discussion of eliminative materialism as a theory 
in the philosophy of mind, see Paul Church land, Matter and 
Consciousness, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 43-49. 
Searle and Church land cri tigue each others' position in "Is the 
Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" and "Could a Machine Think?" 
Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 26-37. 
7' John C. Eccles, "A Dualist -Interactionist Perspective. 
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'." The 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 430. 
ElJohn Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 452-53. 
'ii'Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, eds., The 
Mind's I (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 377. 
iOlbid. 
1Sear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 452. 
2John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 121. 
1.3Daniel Dennett, "The Milk of Human Intentionality. 
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'," The 
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 429. 
Koperski 34 
:14Sear l e , Minds, Brains, and Science, 34. 
1sSear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 419. 
1.6Marvin Minsky, "Minds are Simply What Brains Do." Truth 
2 (1988): 11. 
17Sear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 452. 
1sHofstadter and Dennett, 373. 
19Term used by Dennett, 429. 
2°Ned Block, "What Intuitions about Homunculi Don't Show. 
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'." The 
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 425. 
21For readers with computer backgrounds, Ed designates 
specific flashlights to serve as internal and external memory. 
Flashlights in our solar system would serve as one register 
and likewise for other systems. Whole systems would have 
normal hexadecimal addresses. The H-demon is really just a 
super, serial data-bus. It carries the appropriate on-off 
signals to flip-flops (flashlights). 
22To be precise, Searle believes mental terms are not 
~ captured by full physical explanations but should be 
eventually. These explanations will not, however, support the 
RR model. Dualists, on the other hand, hold that mental 
phenomena is not fully reducible to physical phenomena even in 
principle. 
23Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on 
Mind and Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1978), 
272. 
24Baker, Lynne Rudder, Saving Belief: A Critigue of 
Physicalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 
152. 
2SS ee the "combination reply" in Searle, "Minds, Brains, 
and Programs," 421. Searle's argument is along the lines of EP, 
although he does not use these terms. 
27Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (New York: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 196-197. 
2SAnticipating the outcry from my theistic readers, I 
realize I have limited x so that God is likewise not a candidate 
for Ix. Please note that the predicate I is to be taken in a 
restricted sense along the lines of intelligent-l ike-ourselves. 
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God is certainly intelligent in the common sense of the term, 
but he is not intelligent-like-ourselves. This is clearly seen 
in God's omniscience, which is something gui te different from 
intelligent -like-oursel ves. 
..l ________________ ..... 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FRAME PROBLEM 
Within a generation the problem of creating artificial intelligence will be 
substantially solved. 
Marvin Minsky 
Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines, 
The AI problem is one of the hardest science has ever undertaken. 
Marvin Minsky 
"How Can Computers Cet Common Sense?" ~'-== 
In Chapter 1 we saw how the rules-and-representations 
model of cognition used by GOFAI (good-old-fashioned-AD failed 
to distinguish computer syntax from semantics. In this chapter 
we will examine another problem that has plagued GOFAI for two 
decades: the frame problem (hereafter FP). 
Before I say what the problem is, the reader should be 
warned about some side issues. First, there are many articles 
in print that show how some writer mistakenly identifies the 
"real" FP and then goes on to clear things up_ Unfortunately, 
these articles do not always agree on what the real FP is. I 
will not try to sort out this confusion nor will I adopt anyone 
writer's choice of terms. 'FP' here will represent the most 
general rubric for several related and over-lapping topics one 
of which might be called the frame problem proper. 
Second, the FP is related to but not the same as a 
"frame," "script," or "schemata." These terms, now common in 
the AI literature, refer to a programming strategy employed to 
help overcome the FP. This particular strategy will be 
discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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The FP is a guest ion about the relation of propositions 
to one another. Persons, we observe, make key adjustments to 
their noetic web of propositions without being told to do so. 
All the sub-topics wi thin the FP, to be discussed in Section II, 
rela te to the digital computer's inability to either draw on or 
properly manipulate propositions the system already contains.:1 
I will not offer a solution to the FP here. My goal is to 
demonstra te a rational ability we have that computers lack. 
This lack emphasizes the gap between man and machine that 
strong-AI claims to have bridged. 
1. Setting the Stage: Background Knowledge 
Before jumping into the subtopics that collecti vel y make 
up the FP, I would like to introduce a related difficulty. This 
information should help the reader gain a foothold in the 
discussion. Perhaps the easiest way to introduce the problem 
of background knowledge is with my fa vori te illustration by 
Daniel Dennett, the man perhaps most responsible for bringing 
the FP to the attention of the AI community. Consider the 
"snack problem." 
! couldn't make a sandwich without knowing a good deal--about 
bread, spreading mayonnaise, opening the fridge, the friction 
and inertia that will keep the turkey between the bread slices 
and the bread on the plate as I carry the plate over the table 
beside my easy chair. . .. I listed a few of the very many 
humdrum facts one needs to know to solve the snack problem, 
but I didn't mean to suggest that tllose facts are stored in 
me--or in any agent--piecemeal, in the form of a long list of 
sentences explicitly declaring each of tllese facts for the 
benefit of tile agent. . .. We know trillions of things; we know 
that mayonnaise doesn't dissolve knives on contact, that a 
slice of bread is smaller than Mount Everest, that opening the 
refrigerator doesn't cause a nuclear holocaust in the 
kitchen.2 
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Ra tional agents have the ability to form, not just call up from 
memory, the specific propositions reguired to solve everyday 
problems. As Dennett points out, there are many propositions 
that we "know" but do not directly consider as we go about our 
day. 
The problem of background knowledge arises due to the 
program reguirements of serial computers.;::!; To solve any 
problem, a computer must be given a data base of all 
proposi tions needed to solve that problem (i.e., the initial 
condi tions) plus instructions about how these propositions 
relate. The difficulty lies in programming the computer to use 
its data base appropria tel y. Of course, the notion of 
'appropriate' is gui te vague. Somehow we draw on our 
experience to make inferences that relate to our present 
situation. A computer must be instructed (i.e., programmed) to 
make similar right inferences--"right" being another ill-defined 
notion in this context. 
One major difficulty in this project is that we are not 
sure ourselves what principles we use to learn from 
experience. Margaret Boden, a prominent AI writer-philosopher, 
believes that in all human reasoning there are unformalized 
"integra ti ve principles of tad t inference or global knowledge 
of which one is not introspecti vel y aware." 4 Al though the 
nature of these principles is of great interest, we do not need 
to fully understand how we use our experience to in fact make 
use of it. 
I 
..J.. ____________________ ~ 
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This pragmatic use-it-without-understanding-it approach 
is fine for humans. Nonetheless, whatever these principles are 
that we take advantage of, computers do not have them--thus 
the problem. Once again, all ini tial conditions plus the 
principles of inference between propositions must be provided 
for the computer. Since we do not know ourselves how we in 
fact make use of experience, it is no surprise that formalizing 
this ability into computer code is a formidable task. 
How past experience affects future events is of course 
not a new puzzle. The problem of induction remains unsolved 
wi th no solution on the horizon. The background knowledge 
problem might simply be a byproduct of the problem of induction, 
but, as Dennett rightly points out, the FP as a whole will 
remain even if induction is resolved. I will come back to this 
later. Let's now move on to a variety of topics that all claim 
to be at least part of the FP. 
II. The Frame Problem(s) 
The FP in its broad sense is a computer's inability to 
"know" how any single piece of information affects the rest of 
a data base. Let's say for simplicity's sake that a data base, 
a t a certain level of description, contains propositions. When 
a programmer inputs a new proposition, how does a computer 
determine which other propositions are affected? There is 
currently no way to determine which specific propositions are 
to be changed without an exhaustive search of the data base. 
Such a search, however, is highly inefficient and not 
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compu tat ion all y practical given the time restraints we put on 
intelligence (i.e., systems that take days to solve simple 
problems are not considered candidates for intelligence even 
by strong-AD. 
To illustrate, say I have a large stack of index cards, 
wi th one sentence per card, that collecti vel y explains the 
United States strategy for arms negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. Intelligence sources then report that the Soviets have 
secretly withdrawn all troops from Poland. This new 
informa tion will reguire a revision in some of the sentences on 
my index cards, but how many and which ones? The only way to 
know is to look through them all. 
Dennet t sees the FP not as a technical hurdle for AI, 
but a general epistemic guestion: How does any cogni ti ve 
creature know which conceptual propositions need to be updated 
to keep one's internal model "roughly faithful to the world."s I 
will of course limit the discussion to the AI realm and not 
explore the larger epistemic guestion. 
For the most part, this section will only present the 
difficulties for AI. How programmers do in fact circumvent (or 
a t least minimize) the FP will be dealt with in Section III. 
Let's now examine the components of this large problem. 
A. Data Retrieval. Assuming that all the reguisi te facts 
for solving a given range of guestions are provided in a data 
base, how does a computer get to these facts to make use of 
them? Well-known AI critic Hubert Dreyfus explains, 
To establish that a fact exists in its data banks a computer 
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must retrieve it. Worse, to establish that some fact is not in 
the data bank requires examining the entire list of what the 
computer knows to determine that the fact in question is 
missing. 6 
In contrast, Dreyfus cites Richard Shaffer's example of our 
(usuall y) direct access to our knowledge.7' I know immedia tel y 
when I was born and with some thought I can recall when my 
mother was born. I know immedia tel y that I do not know when 
Thomas Jefferson was born and no amount of thinking will 
retrieve that information. I know that I do not know it. In a 
computer, only an exhaustive search can reveal the absence of 
any fact. 
If the reader does not think exhaustive searching is 
much of a hindrance, especially with the speeds at which modern 
computers operate, consider that the world's best chess 
playing system, Carnegie-Mellon's "Deep Thought," can calculate 
750,000 positions per second. By 1992, the rate should exceed 
one billion positions per second. s For the system to calculate 
the best move in any given si tua tion, an exhaustive search of 
all possible counter-moves and counter-counter-moves, etc., 
would have to be made. However, it is estimated that there 
are 10120 different possible games of chess. Even if Deep 
Thought could calculate a billion games per second, an 
exhaustive search would take over 100 trillion trillion 
centuries. This will not do. How is it that the chess program 
on my PC thrashes me in much less time? 
The answer is that programmers are well aware of 
algorithms for more efficient data base searching- One such 
~------------------
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method is the use of heuristics. Heuristic rules are short-
cuts or rules-of-thumb that people often use in decision 
making. For example, in chess I use rules-of-thumb like 'don't 
sacrifice a bishop to capture a knight'. Rules like this are a 
common programming tool to help cutdown compu ta tion time. 
There are two major problems with the heuristic 
solu tion. First, the approach makes the problem less 
noticeable but fails to solve it. For a data base search that 
is both accurate and fast, very specific heuristics are 
reguired. Such rules are often hard to specify when the data 
becomes overly large and complex. The second objection is more 
problematic: the rules don't always apply. As any chess player 
knows, sometimes you have to sacrifice the bishop. The second 
is a more formidable problem since the computer has no way of 
determining when such rule breaking is allowed unless there is 
yet another rule to tell it to do so. That is, the system would 
need second order heuristics for breaking first order 
heuristics, and so on. A point of diminishing returns develops 
such that the time spent searching for applicable rules 
sacrifices the time saved by employing heuristics in the first 
place. 
To digress for a moment, this need for rule breaking 
points to what some call the hard/soft paradox of AI. <;> Some 
human reasoning appears to be rule-governed (e.g., logic, 
grammar, etc.). The computer's algorithmic ("hard") rules are 
perfectly suited to simulate such thinking. Hard rules cannot 
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be violated except by the instruction of another hard rule. 
In everyday situations, however, we find many instances 
where rules are appropriately broken. Consider the rule 'do 
not throw cold water on your wife'. This rule should 
immediately be broken if my wife's hair catches fire. The 
"soft" side of human reasoning is the ability to intuit 
circumstances that call for extreme or unusual action. In 
these cases, the computer's algorithmic rules become a 
hindrance. 
I can think of few rules of behavior that persons should 
not violate under any condition. I do not believe, however, 
that I have a ready made criteria for identifying the 
circumstances under which such rule breaking is reguired. 
Such decisions must often be made "on the spot." This need for 
adaptability is a notorious problem for AI. 
In sum, although programming technigues such as heuristic 
rules lessen the data retrieval problem, no method thus far 
has solved it. There appears to be a profound difference 
between men and digital computers regarding memory itself and 
the relation between memory and behavior. 
B. Relevant Facts. Perhaps the key difficulty in the FP 
is determining the relevancy of facts. That is, given the vast 
number of facts available to make any single decision, how can 
a computer choose the relevant ones and ignore the rest? 
Consider again my stack of index cards on arms 
negotiations. Someone asks "if the Soviets destroy half of 
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their ICBM's, how many cruise missiles can we give up?" I would 
like to consider only those cards that have to do with cruise 
missiles, but I don't know which ones they are until I search 
through the whole stack skimming for the word 'cruise', 
Furthermore, there may be some cards that do not have 'cruise' 
on them, but are relevant to the question. How do I get to 
these wi thou t wading through the entire stack again? It 
appears that the exhaustive search continues to be the only 
way to be sure. 
Again heuristic rules can be used to help determine 
relevancy. Consider Haugeland's theoretical computer with an 
English language data base that must determine how to 
interpret 'the pig is in the pen',:10 'Pen' of course has 
multiple uses in English. The computer must determine if 'pen' 
is a place on a farm or a writing instrument. The relevant 
fact for solving the ambiguity is that pigs cannot fit into a 
writing instrument. The problem is, how does the computer 
determine the relevant fact in this case has to do with size? 
How does the computer determine the key feature in any case? 
A possible solution to the Haugeland example is that "in" 
usually has a size implication. The computer could solve the 
ambigui t y with the heuristic semantic rule 'a sentence of the 
form "x is in y" implies that y is larger than x'. The drawback 
to this solution is twofold. First, as the number of semantic 
rules like this one becomes large, the computer would need 
meta-semantic rules to determine which semantic rules are 
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relevant. How will the computer know if any of these rules 
(semantic, meta-semantic, and so on) should be broken? More 
rules for rule breaking are reguired Once again, 
heuristics push the problem back but do not solve it. Second, 
"in" is itself ambiguous in this context. This particular 
semantic rule will not work for the sentence 'The pig is in the 
photograph'. Other non-heuristic methods for determining 
relevant fact will be presented in the next section. 
Before moving on, let me refer back to the problem of 
induction. Following Dennett, let's assume a computer has 
somehow overcome the problem and now has perfect inductive 
"beliefs." The computer still suffers from the FP since it will 
still have no way of prioritizing this massive array of beliefs 
about the future. Exhaustive knowledge about the future, 
based on past experience, does not insure that such knowledge 
will be used effectively. 
A walking encyclopedia will walk over a cliff, for all its 
knowledge of cliffs and the effects of gravity, unless it is 
designed in such a fashion that it can find the r.l9..bl bits of 
knowledge at the r.l9..bl times, so it can plan its engagements 
with the real world (emphasis mine)," 
C. Selective Updating: The Bookkeeping Problem. Some 
consider the bookkeeping problem to be the key difficulty of 
the FP. Consider a data base of propositions tha t collectively 
form a model of, say, a desk with colored blocks on it: 
Blockworld. Let the model be output in three dimensional 
graphics so everyone can see IrJha t Blockworld looks like. 
Blockworld is set up to correspond to a group of real colored 
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blocks on my desk. Thus when I turn the blue block on my desk 
on its side, I input a new proposition, p, to the Blockworld 
model, p = 'The blue block is turned on its side'. 
The question is, which other propositions need to be 
revised when p is added to keep the model accurate? Of course 
all of the propositions which contain 'blue block' might need 
revision and only those need be considered if the blu,e block is 
alone in the middle of the desk. But what if ten other blocks 
are stacked on the blue block? Now a large number of spatial 
propositions need to be revised that do not contain 'blue 
block', 
Depending on the overall si tua tion, some propositions 
must be updated and others left alone. Provided that causal 
interactions are all part of the model (e.g. moving blue block 
causes ten others to fall), the computer must access each 
proposition in the model to find if it needs revision. But as 
we saw, exhaustive searches are time consuming and heuristics 
alone do not solve the problem. An efficient method for 
selectively updating only the relevant information is required. 
Of course this assumes the relevant facts problem has already 
been solved. 
Let's now look at some of the programming techniques 
used to circumvent the FP. 
III. Repairs and Solutions 
A. Repairs. To lessen the effects of the FP, some 
applications use the "cheap test.":l.2 The program contains 
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commands that exclude irrelevant parts of the data base from 
the search. For example, in Blockworld there might be a 
limi ting rule like 'when an object moves, color and size are not 
affected'. The data base could be easily organized so that 
propositions about color and size are grouped. The program 
would then "flag" these groups to exclude them from the search. 
Unfortunately, the cheap test is actually a kind of 
heuristic and is subject to the drawbacks mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, such limiting rules do not always apply. If the 
objects in Blockworld are ice cubes or clay, for example, 
friction will change the shape of the blocks when they are 
moved. By now the reader should see the relationship between 
the scope of application and the proportional need for more 
(perhaps second order) rules. 
Another programming techniClue is the "sleeping dog" 
approach.:1.3 The program is instructed to leave all 
propositions alone unless there is some positive reason to 
revise them. That is, when a new proposition is introduced, the 
program assumes that without sufficient warrant or 
computational relevance nothing else in the data base is 
affected. 
The glaring difficulty with using the sleeping dog 
approach in any general application is how to specify 
"sufficient warrant" or "computational relevance." Defining 
these terms and then encoding them for the computer the FP! 
I do not mean to imply that either the cheap test or the 
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sleepin9 d09 approach are useless. They are gui te sufficient 
for dealin9 with a variety of applications. The criticisms here 
are intended to show that neither is able to solve the FP for 
very general or complex applications. 
As Dennett has pointed out, there appears to be another 
inherent problem with all such relevancy tests.:L4 The 90a1 is 
to make the system limit its focus to only certain <i.e., 
"relevant") inferences. The two approaches mentioned add a 
relevancy axiom to cut down on the calculated inferences. 
Dennet t points out, however, that in any (monotonic) deductive 
system, the addition of an axiom never reduces the number of 
inferences a vailable, it always increases them. Otherwise, the 
new axiom must be inconsistent with a previous one. 
For example, consider a closed deductive system with 
five axioms. Let's say that there are twenty proofs calculable 
from these axioms. Now add a sixth axiom. If Axiom 6 makes any 
of the previous twenty proofs invalid, it is inconsistent with 
one of the first five axioms. Say Axiom 6 is consistent with 
the first five and is a relevancy test which is supposed to 
limit the number of inferences. Instead of limiting steps, the 
program will calculate all the same inferences (the twenty 
proofs) plus calculate their relevancy (i.e., solve the proofs 
that follow from the addition of Axiom 6, the relevancy test). 
What we really want is for the system to ignore 
irrelevant data, not calculate that the data is irrelevant and 
then i9nore it. No one wants a computer to waste valuable 
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compu ta tion time calculating all of the propositions tha t it 
can ignore. 
B. Scripts: A REAL solution? The most successful 
solution to the FP to date is the use of "scripts" (Schank), 
"frames" (Minsky), and "schemata" (Rumelhart). For those 
unfamiliar with field, the difference is negligible. The 
dissimilarity lies in the degree of a program's "anticipation." 
Here are the computer scientists' own explanations of this 
approach: 
Minsky: A frame is a data-structure for representing a 
stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living 
room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each 
frame are several kinds of information. Some of this 
informa tion is about how to use the frame. Some is about wha t 
one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if 
these expectations are not confirmed. . .. Much of the 
phenomenological power of the theory hinges on the inclusion of 
expectations and other kinds of presumptions. 15 
Schank: We define a script as a predetermined causal chain of 
conceptualiza tions that describe the normal sequence of things 
in a familiar situ a tion. Thus there is a restaurant script, a 
birthday-party script, a football game script, a classroom 
script, and so on. 16 
The abili t y-to-ignore, lacking in other techniClues, is not 
attained through the addition of a new IGNORE-algorithm in the 
program. Instead the system's attention is focused by the 
stereotypical expectations of the script. 
This anticipatory behavior of a script roughly simulates 
our own day-to-day interactions. When someone enters a 
familiar si tua tion, like Schank's football game script, he has 
certain expectations and customary actions that help him to 
socially negotiate the activity. If he encounters something 
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hi'3hly unusual, say his chili-do'3 bursts into a chorus of "God 
Save the Queen," it takes time to sort ou t what's '3oin'3 on and 
what the appropriate reactions mi'3ht be. 
Similarly a robot runnin'3 scripted software has no 
difficulties within the prepro'3rammed expectations. That is, 
when the robot's encounters fit the script, its reactions are 
easily accessed by the prO'3ram thus circumventin'3 exhaustive 
searches, relevancy tests, etc. Abnormal encounters take 
10n'3er to deal with, not unlike reactions in persons. 
There are some usual guestions a GOFAI cri tigue asks at 
this point. The first of which usually involves adaptability: 
Does the script technigue allow for a wide ran'3e of 
applica tions 7:1.7 When thin'3s proceed as usual, the computer's 
script can deal with most problems and has an acceptable ran'3e 
of adaptability. I will not defend this assertion except to say 
computer scientists would not continue to pursue such a 
research prO'3ram wi thou t limited success. When thin'3s come 
"out of the blue" however, like the aberrant chili-dog, the 
computer's reactions are often not foreseen nor acceptable. 
A more severe problem is related to the relevancy test. 
Not only do persons determine which facts are relevant in a 
'3iven scenario, but they also assign different degrees of 
relevancy to them. We are able to adapt to different "levels 
of weirdness" as John Searle puts it. But even scripted 
software is not able to prioritize its expectations to suit 
dHferent situations. For example, in Schank'$. re$.taurant 
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script, "it is equally 'weird' for the restaurant to be out of 
food as it is for the customer to respond by devouring the 
chef.":19 The singing chili-dog is just as strange in the 
football script as kicking a seventy yard field goal. 
How is it tha t ~..§.. recognize degrees of weirdness? At 
least part of the answer is that we are not isolated to facts 
within a given script; we have access to other facts about 
cuI tural norms and interpersonal relations. For example, a 
woman without a top walking on a beach is highly irregular (i.e., 
the situation, not the woman) in America but not in France. An 
isolated group of "beach facts" cannot be assigned degrees of 
abnormali t y without knowledge of cultural norms. Notice how 
the relevancy test, degrees of relevancy, and background 
knowledge problems all come into play here. 
8i ven these problems with the script technique, why has 
it been such a successful research program? The answer 
ironically yields another criticism: there is an ad hoc fix 
a vailable wi thin each script.:L9 As a programmer debugs a given 
script, he usually stumbles onto the abnormalities that go 
beyond the software's ability to adapt. At these specific 
points, a direct contingency command is implanted to prevent 
the system from "locking up" or doing whatever undesired 
activit y it tends to fall into when confronted with aberrant 
data. Individual scripts can always be saved in this way. 
For example, consider a simple algebraic computer 
program written in BASIC in which some variable A is used in 
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several eCluations. One of the lines of the program is '500 
(B+C)/A'. The programmer notices that if the variable A is 
zero, then line 500 will generate an error message: division by 
zero is algebraically undefined. To circumvent this problem, 
the programmer can put in a line '490 If A=O, then 550' which 
instructs the program to skip over line 500 and execute line 
550 if A is zero. This strategy is a perfectly acceptable 
hoc fix for preventing division by zero, but it is obvious 1 y 
restricted to this problem. 
Unfortunately, ad hoc solutions are not sufficient to 
solve the FP in general. Scripts are a useful approach for 
solving specific problems but this strategy cannot overcome 
the digital computer's chronic lack of adaptability. 
Scripted software was hoped to be the key to solving a 
host of GOFAI puzzles. In the early 80's it became evident 
that current scripts were not performing as expected and some 
of the strong-AI rhetoric started to be toned down. For 
example, compare Minsky's 1967 Cluote at the beginning of the 
chapter with this one from 1981: 
Just constructing a knowledge base is a major intellectual 
research problem. . .. We still know far too little about the 
contents and structure of common-sense knowledge. A 'minimal' 
common-sense system must 'know' something about cause-and-
effect, time, purpose, locality, process, and types of 
knowledge ... , We need a serious epistemological research 
effort in this area.:20 
Let's assume that scripts in the future will overcome 
all the aspects of the FP mentioned so far. There appear to 
be two more problems on the horizon that affect this approach. 
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IV. Future Hurdles 
A. The Folding Problem. Assume for the moment that 
humans work from something like scripts. As I sit here in the 
midst of my thesis-script, say I come to a sticking point--I 
just don't know how to work out some conceptual problem. But I 
recall from my history-class-script that in World War II the 
Americans, in order to liberate others, ini tiall y bypassed well 
fortified islands held by the Japanese. I take the "principle" 
(an admit tedl y ill defined notion that I will not shore up here) 
of temporarily bypassing difficult obstacles and apply it wi thin 
my thesis-script by moving on to the next topic. In script 
terminology, I have folded information from two unrelated 
scripts. Programming a computer to do likewise is the heart of 
the "folding problem." 
Within the limited universe of a given script, some AI 
programs adapt well to new information and can generally limit 
the crunch of the FP. Some Alers believe that when enough 
powerful scripts are loaded into one compu tel"', it will behave 
intelligently in all script-scenarios and therefore, under 
GOFAI, will be intelligent. 
The folding problem is simply this: computers do not 
channel general principles between isolated scripts. As my 
previous illustration shows, we are able to learn from a given 
situation and apply our knowledge to new unrelated settings. 
All inferential ties between software scripts, in contrast, 
must be determined in advance. 
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Furthermore, there are also instances when whole, 
unrelated scripts need to be integrated. Assuming persons 
rely on a restaurant-script and a birthday-part y-script, we 
can easily fold these two scripts together when a birthday 
part y is held in a restaurant. Such smooth combinations of 
discrete scripts do not just emerge within a program. To solve 
the folding problem, programmers must find a way to tie 
together the conceptual archipelago of multiple scripts. 
8. The Jumping Problem. Closely related to the folding 
problem, the jumping problem is the computer's inability to make 
a smooth transition between scripts. 
For example, say you are eating lunch at the Western 
Steer (i.e., are in the middle of your restaurant-script) when 
your colleague, who has illegally made his third trip to the 
one-time-onl y salad bar, begins choking on a tomato. You must 
immediately transition from your restaurant-script to a 
choking-script to save his life. An observing computer 
meandering through its restaurant-script has no ready made 
way of jumping to another. Inference bridges would have to be 
provided in advance between all possibly connected scripts--
obviously demanding a great deal of foresight on the part of 
the programmer. 
Scripts are unguestionably useful within a well defined 
scenario. The folding and jumping problems show, however, that 
dail y cogni ti ve acti vi ties reguire interaction between normal, 
stereotypical situations. In the next section I will examine 
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some criticisms directed at the FP itself. That is, some claim 
the FP is a pseudo-problem. 
V. A Real Problem? 
The most outspoken antagonist of the FP is Drew 
McDermott. His criticism is three-pronged. 2 :1 First, the above 
mentioned sleeping dog method has been a sufficient 
programming technigue for most of the last fifteen years. It 
is so successful, in fact, that no one in the field is even 
working on a solution to this mythical FP! Second, regarding 
intelligence, we do not make the same demands of perfection on 
humans that the FP imposes on computers. That is, humans 
cannot take relevant information into account when such 
facts become numerous. Information overload is a problem for 
all cogni ti ve beings, not just computers. Third, the 
philosopher-cri tics ("framist") who push the FP are a moving 
target. Once AIers begin to answer the real FP, framists shift 
to other "re l a ted" problems that are themselves able to be 
overcome. 
Patrick Hayes, in the article right after McDermott's in 
one anthology, responds to McDermott's challenge. 
The frame problem is sometimes dismissed as being a narrow, 
technical problem of little philosophical interest. , " J think 
this is a mistake, For one thing, a 'narrow technical problem' 
which is this immediate, this central, this devastating, and this 
resistant to solution is worthy of some respect,22 
Why isn't anyone working on the FP? Because, as I pointed out 
earlier, for each script under consideration, there is always 
an =-='--'-:..=-.::::.. fix that takes care of that and only that script. 
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Wha tever this fix maybe, it generally is not applicable to 
another script. 
The overload problem in McDermott's second prong is for 
the most part correct. Although he fails to consider our 
abilities to prioritize incoming information based on 
experience, McDermot t rightly points out that GOFAI critics 
should not demand that a computer surpass man's cognitive 
abili ties. All finite beings can consider only a finite number 
of propositions at one time and are thus subject to 
informa tion overload. McDermott's point is granted, but 
unfortunately for GOFAI, the FP is more than just a breakdown 
of information management. 
Another reason for taking the FP seriously, albeit a 
somewha t anecdotal one, is that it appears to be at the heart 
of the "conversion" of one of GOFAI's key workers, Terry 
Winograd. According to Dreyfus, Winograd now teaches 
Heidegger to his computer science students at Stanford to help 
show the difficulties of formalizing background knowledge and 
making scripts interact.23 The point is, McDermott is simp 1 y 
wrong when he claims that computer scientists do not feel the 
tension of the FP. Winograd is the most visible strong-AI 
"defector" to date. 
VI. Conclusion 
How does this chapter support my overall case against 
strong-AI? I believe the problem helps show that human 
knowers are different from (at =-==-=::...:::.. disitaD computers in kind; 
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not simply in degree of complexity. The rational, human ability 
to make key changes to one's noetic web without rules or 
instructions on how to make such changes is not shared by 
program driven systems. The FP shows that simply having more 
powerful programs/rules does not eliminate the problem. This 
unigue rational ability is evidence that men are more that very 
fast, very powerful, and very complex rule-governed machines. 
As long as this man-machine gap remains in place, the claims of 
strong-AI will retain their status as optimistic exaggerations. 
To conclude, I would like to digress into epistemology 
proper for a moment. In most epistemic models, except very 
pure forms of coherence justification, philosophers realize 
that some beliefs play a more significant role in our noetic 
structure than others. These "weightier" beliefs support the 
lesser ones or at least reguire a greater amount of evidence 
before they may be revised. How beliefs relate to and rely on 
one another is a subject of great debate (e.g., what is it for 
one proposition to be evidence for another?). Understanding 
the nature of this relation is not reguired for persons to, in 
fact, hold and prioritize their beliefs. 
This lack of knowledge about knowledge will not do for 
GOFAI. Programmers must guess how inference, evidence, and 
even induction work and then go on to formalize these opague 
notions. In this light, it is little wonder why philosopher's 
often view GOFAI claims with skepticism. 
I 
I i 
~ 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OVERSEER PROBLEM 
If we are to avoid the morass of metaphysics [!], we must reduce as 
many concepts as possible to numerical terms. On the other hand, we 
must face the fact that the most important aspects of human life are 
intrinsically nonnumerical. Any attempt to ignore this is highly unscientific. 
In the true intellectual approach, one accepts this fact and copes with it. 
Richard Bellman 
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn Symposium on 
the Mathematical Theory of Automata, 1962 
The conceptual difficulties discussed in the last two 
chapters usually involve serial digital computers. On the 
cutting edge of computer technology lies another architecture 
that may very well overcome both the challenge of the Chinese 
Room and the Frame Problem. The programmes are often called 
connectionism, parallel distributed processing (PDP), neural 
networks, and massively parallel systems, although these names 
are not fully synonymous. There is unfortunately no space 
here to provide an adequate overview of this new approach, 
however, there are a handful of introductory articles 
a vailable.:t 
In this chapter I will present another problem for 
strong-AI that affects both conventional computers and PDP. I 
must ask the reader to assume that what I attribute to PDP is 
correct and not open for discussion at this point. The purpose 
here is not to quibble about what PDP does or how it 
accomplishes its tasks; I will simply grant most of the claims 
made by computer scientists in this young field. I will then go 
on to show tha t neither digital computers nor PDP's escape 
..l _____________ ~_ 
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wha t I call the Overseer Problem <oP). 
1. Connectionism: The New Frontier 
Recall my Blockworld illustration from Chapter 2. In 
short, the computer's program constructs an internal model of 
a room with colored blocks. The key to Blockworld is the 
software: the better the program, the better the model. In 
contrast, PDP does not use a program. Instead the system is 
trained (invoking the anthropomorphic gualifier one last time) 
through examples. That is, the system develops its own 
generalizations and internal representations from particular 
examples without algorithmic instructions on how this 
representation is to be constructed. 
For example, let's say a given neural net receives input 
from a video camera that is pointed at various live dogs. 
After a large number of sample-dogs has been given to the net, 
the system will form an internal representation of a paradigm-
dog. Once trained (not programmed) the net can distinguish 
dogs from other objects. Giving a sophisticated net a great 
deal of training should allow it to distinguish dogs from cats, 
cows, and perhaps even from statues of dogs. 
For the reader whose knowledge of computers is limited 
to the digital variety, it might be difficult at first to 
appreciate the tremendous difference between a conventional 
and a non-programmable system. The key is that no program 
means no rules; PDP rejects the RR theory of cognition. 
The approach that we take in developing PDP models is 
completely different [from serial digital computers]. First, we 
do not assume tl1at the goal of learning is tl1e formulation of 
~-------------------------
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explicit rules. Rather, we assume it is the acquisition of 
connection strengths which allow a network of simple units to 
act as though it knew the rules. 2 
PDP might offer a way around the Chinese Room since, 
without a program, there is no (prescriptive) syntax. 3 Few are 
claiming that neural nets are sophisticated enough to 
"understand" a natural language; however, the syntax-semantics 
distinction that the Chinese Room relies on is harder to define 
when there is no program. As for the Frame Problem, PDP 
memory is not stored in data-bases but rather throughout the 
net (cf. holographic images). For reasons that I cannot explore 
here, such content-based memory makes the relevant facts 
issue much less of a problem. Whether PDP can solve the Frame 
Problem or the Chinese Room must wait for another time. Let's 
now examine the problem PDP does not escape. 
II. The Overseer Problem 
In short, the OP is the inability of artificial systems to 
perform independently, that is, wi thou t the prior assistance of 
an intelligent agent to set the parameters of the system's 
task and to determine when that task is to be considered 
correct or complete. 4 The task-determination part is somewhat 
trivial. Humans, after all, usually design artifacts for the 
purpose of carrying out specific tasks. Task-completion and 
valida tion, knowing when the job is done correctly, is another 
matter. 
A. The Overseer and PDP. How does PDP come to know a 
right or wrong answer? What is the "right" answer to a problem 
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for a system that has just been activated, ini ball y lacking any 
data to work with? Let's begin with a theoretical neural net 
in action. 
Consider a net designed to distinguish kinds of cars by 
color and manufacturer. First, the net must be "trained up" 
from examples of cars. To do this, the system is attached to a 
video camera in a parking lot. For training, the camera first 
must be pointed at a car and then the net makes a random 
guess of color and manufacturer. Actually, at this early stage 
the net does not have an internal representation of 'color' or 
'manufacturer'; the guess is a true shot-in-the-dark. The 
net's trainer inputs a new signal that either reinforces the 
current internal representation, in the case of a correct 
guess, or alters the representation, in the case of a. wrong 
guess. After a large number of examples and correction 
signals, the net is trained. That is, the system has developed 
a paradigm model for each color and each manufacturer, 
respectively. Now the camera can point to any car and the net 
will determine the make and color. 
The key to the OP is the role of the trainer. Of course, 
the trainer must determine the nature of the problem to be 
solved. More importantly, the trainer already has knowledge of 
what constitutes a right or wrong response from the neural 
net. From the net's point of view, as it were, one answer is 
just as good as the next. The net has no objective reference 
for determining correct results except by the feedback of the 
~~ 
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trainer. 
For some readers, this analysis may be a matter of high-
lighting the obvious. If so, recall the claims of strong-AI, 
such as the opening quote of the introduction: "We are about 
to conceive of the knower as a computing machine." The thrust 
of the OP is that "the knower," if he is to be given equal 
cogni ti ve status to human agents, must be able to function 
without an overseer to specify tasks and predetermine the 
na ture of correct responses. Al though I have found little 
attention given to this problem, here are a couple of notable 
quotes: 
Our license to speak of these systems as judging similarity 
depends upon the fact they classify together patterns that we 
also take to be similar {emphasis mine).5 
The problem here is that the designer has determined ... that 
certain possible generalizations will never be found. All this 
is well and good for toy problems ... but in real-world 
situa tions a large part of human intelligence consists in 
generalizing in ways that are appropriate to a context. If the 
designer restricts the net to a predefined class of 
appropriate responses, the net will be exhibiting the 
intelligence built into it by the designer for the context but 
will not have the common sense that would enable it to adapt 
to other contexts, as a truly human intelligence would. S 
B. The Overseer and GOFAI. The OP looms larger for 
GOFAI. In PDP, the system only needs to be fed "right" 
examples. Likewise in programmed digital computers, correct 
data must be input (recall the programmer's cliche "garbage in, 
garbage out"), Furthermore, the entire structure of the 
computer's task must be defined in detail in the body of the 
program. Right and wrong are, in a manner of speaking, in the 
eyes of the beholder--in this case the person writing the 
II1II6.
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software code. The OP here is quite stark. The computer does 
nothing wi thou t an overseer-programmer to define a) the 
problem, b) the nature of correct answers, and c) a detailed 
algori thm for how the problem is to be addressed. The last 
requirement, (c:), makes the OP stronger for GOFAI than for PDP 
since, once again, the latter has no program. 
C. Objection: PDP Can Overcome OPe The unique abiE ties 
of PDP might offer a way to overcome the OPe There is, the 
objection runs, no need for a program and therefore no need 
for a programmer-overseer. Inherent in the PDP architecture 
is a 
very simple mechanism for extracting regularities from an 
ensemble of inputs without the aid of sophisticated 
generalization or rule-formulating mechanisms that oversee the 
performance of the processing system. These learning rules 
are completely local, in the sense that they change the 
connection between one unit and another on the basis of 
information that is locally available to the connection rather 
than on the basis of global information about overall 
performance. The model thus stands as an alternative to the 
view that learning in cognitive systems involves the explicit 
formulations of rules and abstractions under the guidance of 
some explicit overseer (emphasis mine).7 
Unlike a programmed computer, neural nets form 
conceptual representations apart from any guidance on how this 
formation is to be done. For example, our own conceptual 
schemes intended to represent the physical world rely heavily 
on our five senses. The distinguishing features of objects 
are often given in terms of shape, color, size, texture, etc. 
In contrast, consider another theoretical neural net 
that distinguishes trees from telephone poles. This net's 
input consists of a TV camera, audio microphone, radar, and 
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infrared detector. With this array of choices from which the 
net will build its paradigm-tree and paradigm-telephone-pole, 
we have no idea nor control over what "sensory" input the net 
will decide is significant. The net's determination of 
significance and its internal representation are completely 
unknown to any programmer-overseer. In Kantian terms, we do 
not know what categories the net will develop to distinguish 
the two kinds of objects. 
Anyone who fully understands the OP will see that this 
a t tempt to escape the problem will not do. First, an overseer 
is reguired to define a problem for the net to solve. Second, 
even without an algorithm for solving the tree-pole problem, 
the neural net still reguires an overseer to say whether the 
output during training is right or wrong. Without this 
feedback, the net cannot build its paradigms. Third, the net's 
abili ty to make generalizations can only be exercised if it is 
gi ven the correct exemplars on which to base its model. Three 
trees may be sufficient to give the net some prototype of 
'tree,' but what if the trainer mistakenly inputs a bush? Then 
the paradigm is distorted and the net's performance is 
diminished. In this way the accuracy of the net's future 
performance is wholly dependent on being pro perl y trained, 
where "proper" is once again in the eyes of the overseer. 
III. Induction 
At this point, I would like to demonstrate the OP in 
action. The problem of induction has stubbornly refused to 
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succumb since the time of Hume and, with Goodman's help, it has 
actually intensified. Let's see how the problem of induction 
(PI) and the overseer problem jointly pose a conceptual snare 
for strong-AI. 
We want computers to make the "right" inferences based 
on experience. Then again, we hope to make similar right 
inferences. When are we justified in going from "x j3's have all 
been found to be y" to "all j3'S are y" or even "it is probable 
that the next j3 I observe will be y"? How many observations are 
required? Since the PI is still unsolved, we can only observe 
that we do in fact make judgments about the future based on 
past experience. 
How does a computer solve the PI? Answer: An overseer 
works out the solution in advance. To illustrate, recall from 
Chapter 2 the "script" technique in programming. Stereotypical 
situations (e.g., the restaurant script, the ball game script) 
are given to the computer as guidelines to opera te within. 
However, to describe a given situation as "stereotypical" 
implies that we already know what regularities are to be 
expected in the future in such a scenario. This simply ignores 
the PI, as we almost always do in our day-to-day routines. A 
scripted program is a safety net provided by the overseer to 
insure that the system makes the "right" inferences. Thus the 
system never faces real induction. 
Al though things are better for PDP, the overseer is 
often presupposed in induction problems. For instance, from a 
d 
Koper-ski 68 
given number of exemplars the net will establish that "all 
Trans Ams have been Pontiacs" and thus "the next Trans Am 
examined will be a Pontiac." However, if the goal of the 
training is to get the net to form this "belief," obviously the 
overseer must have been satisfied in advance that this belief 
is true. 
I should point out that part of the power of PDP is its 
ability to make inferences and detect patterns not found by 
humans looking at the same data. For example, banks and 
insurance companies currently use neural net simulations to 
detect financial patterns that will help determine loan 
applications, etc. In some respects, neural nets are better at 
induction than we are. The reason this ability is insufficient 
to solve the OP lies in the training. For any net to make 
inferences, an overseer is still reguired to train the net with 
examples that the overseer already knows to be "correct" 
inductive inferences. 
To conclude the discussion on the PI, I would like to 
address a conceptual issue arising from differences in 
educa tion. One reason AIers do not wrestle with induction the 
wa y philosophers do is because engineers, ma thema ticians, and 
computer scientists approach the subject through probability 
theory. An informal yet philosophically significant part of 
probabili t y theory is what I will call the all-things-being-
egual wand. s 
To illustrate, I recall my introduction to probability 
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theory in a communications class. The professor would always 
talk about the probability of a given event "all-things-being-
egua1." An example would be, liThe probability of this coin 
coming up heads when flipped is 0.5, all-things-being-egual." 
We understood that this gualifier meant we could ignore the 
probability of a bird diving through the window and snatching 
the coin or the probability of the coin spontaneously 
decomposing. For all such instances, the professor would 
always wave the all-things-being-egual wand to eliminate 
unwanted factors. 
Returning to AI, without an overseer providing the 21.11-
things-being-egual wand for the computer, the system has no 
way of "just knowing" what factors can legitimately be ruled 
out. Somehow all of the students in my communications class 
understood what factors were eliminated by "all-things-being-
egua1." Unless computers can develop a similar ability, the 
overseer will not fade into irrelevance. And unless the 
overseer fades into irrelevance, strong-AI claims will continue 
to be exaggerated. 
IV. Thesis Conclusion 
There is a danger in criticizing AI that I have tried to 
a void in this work. Too often critics point to what computers 
currently fail to do without a view toward advancing 
technology. This tactic is a trap: Picking at the difficult 
technological barriers and hardware-software limi ta tions faced 
by AI today will inevitably backfire. 
J 
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For example, digital computers have had a longs·tanding 
difficult y in processing and recognizing images. Given 
sufficient computing time, most systems could be programmed to 
recognize faces; however, we have the ability to recognize a 
given face almost immediately. For years critics like Hubert 
Dreyfus have cited "elementary" perceptual mistakes made by 
computers that the average child could avoid. Today, computer 
image processing is gui te advanced. Consider the accuracy of 
Tomahawk cruise missiles used in the Gulf War. With the help 
of a maturing technology in charge-coupled devices, many of 
Dreyfus' early criticisms about computer perception have now 
been met. 
Have I avoided this trap? I'm not sure. Unless digital 
computer technology gives way to PDP, the Chinese Room will 
retain its force (see note 3). The Frame Problem may very IAJell 
be solved or at least made much less noticeable in time and I 
do not claim that it is an insurmountable difficulty. The 
Overseer Problem, however, is highly conceptual and will not 
likely fall in the wake of new technology. If I have left myself 
vulnerable to the trap, so be it. 
What has been accomplished in this thesis? Instead of 
simply recapping my arguments from Chapters 1-3, I would like 
to address strong-AI in general. The three chapters 
indi viduall y raise guestions that must be answered before 
AIers can claim that computers are intelligent. I do not mean 
that AI research should come to a stop until computer 
d 
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scientists can appease every philosophical nemesis. However, I 
do think these concerns must be addressed before Alers 
continue to lob conceptual bombs into metaphysics, the 
philosophy of language, and particularly the philosophy of mind. 
What has not been accomplished in this thesis? I have 
not developed criteria for intelligence tha t clearly demarcate 
man from machine. Such criteria would draw the discussion far 
afield and would need to consider the problem of other minds 
and perhaps Wit tgenstein's private language argument, 
especiall y where the overseer/trainer is involved. My goal was 
the lesser task of tightening the reins on some in the AI com-
munity. AI has unguestionably helped in the development of the 
necessary conditions for intelligence. Strong-AI claims, 
however, lead the reader to believe that computer science has 
already determined the sufficient conditions for intelligence. 
This claim, I have shown, is too optimistic. 
Finally, I urge readers from all disciplines to keep track 
of their metaphors. Every advanced field of study 
incorporates rather innocent sounding words into the jargon of 
the field. In the case of computer science, words like 'sees', 
'knows', and 'memory' are used to describe computers because 
we know what such words mean when applied to people. We use 
these words metaphorically, which is perfectly fine. Too often 
the metaphor is lost. Common words with technical meanings 
start migrating between fields and then back to ordinary 
speech. It is regrettable when the man-in-the-street becomes 
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confused by this migration. When the scholar and the scientist 
likewise become confused, entire world-views may hang in the 
balance. 
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NOTES 
1The best two articles available appear in the same 
journal. See John L. Tienson, "An Introduction to 
Connectionism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, 
supplement (1987): 1-16 and William Bechtel, "Connectionism and 
the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview." The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 26, supplement (1987): 17-41. 
2David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations 
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1986), 32 
::SA prescriptive syntax, like a computer program, drives 
the system. Executing a program is synonymous with following a 
set of syntactic rules. Without a program, PDP has no driving, 
prescripti ve syntax; however, its internal mechanism maybe 
described syntactically. Although Searle believes the Chinese 
Room is applicable to PDP since there is a syntactic 
description available, I believe the Chinese Room fails unless 
the syntax is prescriptive. 
4John Searle has mentioned a similar problem to OP 
called the "Homunculus Fallacy," but so far he has applied it 
only to digi tal computers. See Searle, "Is the Brain a Digital 
Computer?" APA Proceedings 64 (November 1990): 21-37, 
especiall y pp. 28-29. 
6Bechtel, 27. 
6Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a 
Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at 
Branchpoint," in The Artificial Intelligence Debate: False 
Starts, Real Foundations, ed. Stephen R. Graubard (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1988), 38. 
"7 James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations 
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological and 
Biological Models (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 
1986)' 214. 
BCf. Daniel Dennett, "Cogni ti ve Wheels: The Frame Problem 
of AI," in Minds, Machines, and Evolution, ed. Christopher 
Hookwa y (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 144. 
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